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Introduction 
This article considers the relationship between philosophy of religion and an approach to the study 
of religion which prioritises the experience of lived religion. Considering how individuals and com-
munities live out their faith challenges some of the assumptions of analytic philosophers of religion 
regarding the position the philosopher should adopt when approaching the investigation of religion. 
If philosophy is understood principally as a means for analysing belief, it will have little space for an 
engagement with what it feels like to live out one’s faith.  
 
In this paper I argue that, while the move towards an understanding of lived religion allows for a 
richer account of religion that gets beyond the abstractions (and prejudices) of mainstream philoso-
phy of religion, there is a jewel at the heart of the analytic approach that should not be too quickly 
rejected. In seeking to address ‘religion’, rather than specific faith traditions, the philosopher of reli-
gion opens up an account of the religious which grounds it in the ordinary lives of all human be-
ings, not just the ostensibly ‘religious’ ones. Reading religion in this way challenges a dismissive 
secularism which would see all forms of religious expression as childish aberrations, thus leaving 
no room for an engagement with what Paul Tillich calls ‘the depths’ of human existence. In order to 
combat reductionist accounts of what it is to be human, I shall contend that the fully human life re-
quires an engagement with the depths, and thus cannot without cost ignore the religious. To make 
this move, I frame the religious as the desire to move outside the self in order to connect with oth-
ers, and with the world. Under this account, ‘the religious’ indicates the attempt to connect again 
with the universe. In this way, the attempts of the analytic philosopher of religion to make general-
ised claims about religion complement an appreciation of what it means to live out one’s faith.  
 
The Problem with Analytic Philosophy of Religion  
It is not a particularly original claim to argue that there is a problem with the way in which analytic 
philosophy of religion approaches the study of religion.i For its critics, the attempt to shape itself 
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around the analysis of religious beliefs leads to a reductionist account of religion; not least because 
such an approach fails to engage with the totality of what it means to hold a religious position. Ig-
noring the experience of religion (be that through an engagement with spirituality or through ritual-
istic practice) can only lead to a distorted account of what it is to hold a religious position. The phi-
losopher of religion may respond by saying that the investigation of religious experience has long 
been a vital part of the subject; yet we should note that this engagement tends towards identifying 
religious experience with ‘extraordinary’ or mystical experiences.ii What is lacking is a grounding of 
religious experience in the ordinariness of the religious way of life: although Mark Wynniii and Tasia 
Scruttoniv have sought ways in which to widen the parameters of this aspect of philosophical work.    
 
Notwithstanding such innovations, the commitment to the analysis of belief reveals much about the 
way in which the practice of philosophy is understood. For the analytic philosopher, it is principally 
a method for assessing and analysing. There is a neatness and a precision to the enquiries under-
taken by the philosopher of religion who works in this way. Arguably, it makes philosophy of reli-
gion a relatively straightforward thing to practice. One can focus one’s attention on written ac-
counts, testimonies and credal confessions in order to reach one’s conclusions. To consider the 
lived experience of religious practice requires a much more complex methodology. It might even 
require the kind of empirical research which underpins religious studies, particularly the interview-
ing of participants in order to come to an appreciation of what it means to practice a faith. 
 
The limitations of analytic philosophy of religion for a sophisticated understanding of any religious 
position have long been acknowledged. Most pertinently, D Z Phillips applied his reading of Witt-
genstein to the subject, arguing that the problem with analytic philosophy of religion was that it cre-
ated a philosophical myth which had little to do with what, precisely, the believer thought they were 
doing when they practised their faith. Phillips is scathing about the habitual construction of the di-
vine as ‘an agent whose activities, like those of any other agent, are capable of being understood, 
assessed and judged’.v Alluding to Richard Swinburne’s depiction of God on the very first page of 
The Coherence of Theism, Phillips pulls apart the philosophical construction of God which ema-
nates from Swinburne’s claim that God is 'something like a person without a body’.vi As Phillips 
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shows to devastating affect, this philosophical construct collapses when brought into conversation 
with Christian biblical texts: 'The Bible says that God is a spirit and those who worship him should 
worship him in spirit and in truth. Let’s make the philosophical substitution: “God is a person with-
out a body and they who…” On the other hand, let’s forget it!’vii The claim that God is a transcend-
ent agent who is like us only greater falls at the first hurdle when confronted with the kind of reli-
gious practice which requires the believer to attempt to embody the divine perspective.  
 
What is particularly significant about Phillips’ view is that he does not see these scriptural claims 
about the divine as irrational or lacking meaning. He does not prioritise the philosopher’s concern 
for a coherent account of God. Quite the contrary. For Phillips, the problem is that the philosopher 
has started their investigations with assumptions about what God is firmly in place. These assump-
tions, when tried out in the arena of faith, bear little relationship to that faith’s specific practices and 
texts. General philosophical claims fail to make sense when applied to the specifics of faith. What 
is most important in Phillips’ critique, and what continues to make it pertinent, is that he argues that 
the divine is not an object that can be defined, but, rather, is something revealed in the practices of 
the religious life.  
 
Phillips, then, poses a challenge to any philosopher of religion. If we truly want to understand what 
is involved in religion, we will need to pay close attention to what the believer thinks they are doing, 
rather than distorting religious practice through our own construction of what we think makes for a 
coherent account of the divine.  
 
Swinburne’s concept of God, which Phillips plunders to such stark effect, may date back to the 
1970s, but the shaping of the subject around the coherence of theism remains a key part of the 
syllabus. There is something appealing about reducing the idea of God to something that reflects a 
set of rational arguments. In stripping out the complexity of the believer’s encounter with that which 
they consider to be divine, the philosopher hopes to get at the simplicity of an idea. Not surpris-
ingly, the concept of God ends up as something free-floating, detached from the tenets or practices 
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of any particular world faith. For the philosopher of religion, talk of ‘God’ in any of the Abrahamic 
faiths can be reduced to the attributes of ‘the Omni-god’. 
 
This reductionist approach is not just problematic for thinking seriously about the believer’s God; it 
also spawns a whole set of other problems. Consider, for example, the problem of evil. For the an-
alytic philosopher of religion, the problem of evil is shaped as a puzzle: can you find a way of hold-
ing God’s omnipotence and omni-benevolence as Creator with the reality of evil and suffering?viii 
When the religious person encounters suffering, they do not inevitably turn their attention to solving 
this puzzle intellectually. It is not something that necessarily leads to the end of faith, although we 
should be mindful that it might elicit just that response. For Elie Wiesel, his boyhood faith is de-
stroyed by what he experiences in Auschwitz. But this loss of faith does not come about because 
Wiesel cannot square the philosophical circle. This is not some academic puzzle, but something 
that strikes at the very heart of his existence: ‘Never shall I forget those moments that murdered 
my God and my soul and turned my dreams to ashes.’ ix 
 
This is more than the end of an idea. That not all people respond in the same way to being con-
fronted with evil or suffering should give the philosopher pause. The problem of evil is not in the 
first instance an intellectual problem. It is something that affects the whole of one’s life. Edith 
Stein’s commentary on St John of the Cross’ ‘Dark Night of the Soul’ reveals an entirely different 
response to Wiesel’s. Stein, a German Jew, Catholic convert and nun, having escaped the Nazi 
persecution in Germany, finds sanctuary in a Dutch convent. As she writes her commentary on 
John’s mystical text, the Nazis take over Holland. Eventually, as she finishes her commentary, the 
Nazis deport all Jewish Christian converts, including Stein and her sister Rosa. St John claims that 
is only through suffering, only through the experience of the loss of God, that one gets, paradoxi-
cally, closer to God. This is an idea that Stein, his commentator, embraces. 'Cross and night are 
the way to heavenly light: that is the joyful message of the cross.'x Suffering is not so much a prob-
lem for God, as a mark of the God revealed in the suffering of the crucified Christ. Participating in 
these sufferings makes possible a 'richer participation in the divine life’.xi  
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We are, I hope, getting a sense of the discrepancy between the philosopher’s perspective and that 
of the religious believer. Philosophers of religion such as Philip Quinn and Charles Taliaferro have 
gone some way to recognising the problem of reducing religion to an abstract philosophical con-
struct operating in glorious isolation from any specific faith tradition. In their Companion to Philoso-
phy of Religion, they offer a section specifically on the philosophical issues which emerge in the 
world’s religions. Their introduction notes the significance of considering the diversity of religious 
positions, given that we live in an increasingly global world. The philosopher needs to require a 
new ‘sensitivity’xii to the specificities of the different faiths.   
 
That sensitivity is required should alert us to the problem of considering monotheism as a concept 
of God that transcends the world’s faiths. Even the most superficial study of the three Abrahamic 
traditions reveals how differently each frames their account of the One God. The Christian doctrine 
of God as Trinity does not sit easily with the God revealed as Allah, or with Yahweh revealed in the 
Jewish scriptures. Indeed, if these accounts were so easily reduced to a shared concept, it would 
be difficult to account for the often traumatic history of their engagement with one another. 
 
If there are differences between the three monotheistic traditions when it comes to their respective 
theologies, how much more so is there a divergence between different ways of practising faith 
within any religious tradition.xiii It would seem that the philosophical study of religion will be much 
more complex if we start from the position of faith, rather than the position of rational enquiry.   
 
Lived Religion and the Philosophy of Religion 
Faced with the problems detailed above, some philosophers of religion have sought to frame the 
subject against the backdrop of the experience of faith. For Amy Hollywood, this means starting 
one’s philosophising from a broader recognition of the role of practice. It is impossible to under-
stand ‘religion’ through the lens of belief alone. It is absolutely vital to engage with 'the bodily na-
ture of ritual and other forms of religious practice’.xiv For Tina Beattie, the problem is less philo-
sophical and more institutional. In her analysis, Philosophy of Religion emerges from a Protestant 
context emphasising the importance of right words and right meaning. If one starts from a Catholic 
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perspective, Beattie argues, the understanding of ‘religion’ changes radically. It becomes some-
thing best understood through an exploration of what one does.xv  
 
Beattie’s comments can be applied more broadly. This is not just about the role of ritual in the 
practice in a faith. What does it mean to live as a Christian, or as a Muslim, or as a Jew? What 
does holding a faith position mean for the whole of one’s life? This can be seen in key practices in 
different religious traditions. In Christianity, the question of what it means to be a disciple requires 
more than either commitment to a credal confession or the practice of a particular set of rituals. If 
practiced seriously, the aim is to live out one’s discipleship of Christ in the world.xvi In Islam, simi-
larly, the ritual of daily prayer shapes the lives of those who participate in it. To practice a faith fully 
involves engaging the totality of one’s being: a manner of approach that is not reducible to con-
formity to a set of rationally supported beliefs. Faith involves commitment, a living out of how one 
sees the world. For Rowan Williams, this commitment is best understood as a form of connection. 
Faith is ‘dependable relationship'; a form of confidence in ‘an “other”, who does not change or go 
away’.xvii To understand the Christian life thus requires an engagement with what it means to prac-
tice one’s faith. If we reduce religion to a set of beliefs to be scrutinised, something of the colours 
and tones of the faith that contextualise those beliefs will be lost.   
 
Recognising the limitations of an approach focused on belief finds support in the feminist critique of 
reason. When reason has been defined in the Western tradition, it has invariably been at the ex-
pense of feeling and emotion.xviii These excluded qualities have been associated with women, 
while reason has been associated with men. This has implications for who can do philosophy, but 
also for what is to be valued by the philosopher. Here is Immanuel Kant, concluding that women 
are incapable of deep thought because their very nature is based in sentiment:  
 
 Deep meditation, and a long-sustained reflection are noble but difficult, and do not well  
  befit a person in whom unconstrained charms should show nothing else than a 
beautiful    nature.xix  
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Woe betide the woman who attempts this kind of thought: ‘A woman who has her head full of 
Greek, like Madame Dacier, or carries on fundamental controversies about mechanics, like the 
Marquise de Châtelet, might as well even have a beard.'xx 
 
Kant is not alone in seeing female attributes as problematic for the life of thought. Jean-Paul Sartre 
associates the ‘Other’ from whom the nascent subject must escape with a variety of examples de-
rived from the female body: the full breasts, flattened out, of a woman lying on her back;
xxiii
xxi the 
‘moist and feminine sucking’ that ‘draws me as the bottom of a precipice might draw me';xxii ‘the ob-
scenity of the feminine sex…which “gapes open”’.  To be a philosopher is to avoid succumbing to 
the attributes of the female. It should come as no surprise that the male comes to be seen as the 
model for the philosopher, or that women all too often feel that philosophy is something from which 
they are excluded.xxiv   
 
What gets lost when the emotions are hived off or seen as not properly philosophical? What makes 
religion powerful is its location in the desire - the yearning - to connect the self with the world out-
side the self.xxv This theme is consistently expressed in the Psalms: ‘As the deer pants for streams 
of water, so my soul pants for you, my God’ (Ps 42: 1); ‘I thirst for you, my whole being longs for 
you, in a dry and parched land, where there is no water’ (Ps 63: 1). Desire for that which is divine 
is something felt in the guts and in the heart. It is fundamentally connected to the emotions: ‘Every 
tree in the forest will sing for joy the the Lord arrives to rule the earth’ (Ps 96: 12-13). To introduce 
these powerful religious texts is to challenge the idea that religion is an object which can be ob-
served. Religious sensibility is something that emerges from the depths of experience, something 
that demands a connection with that which is other than the self.   
 
Paul Tillich expresses this notion well when he grounds religion in the human longing for the 
depths. Forget the obsession with belief; or Tillich, it is the quest for a more fulfilling engagement 
with life that shapes the religious quest:  
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 Look at the student who knows the content of the hundred most important books of world 
  history, and yet whose spiritual life remains as shallow as it ever was, or perhaps 
becomes   even more superficial. And then look at an uneducated worker who performs 
a mechanical   task day by day, but who suddenly asks himself: “What does it mean, that I 
do this work?   What does it mean for my life? What is the meaning of my life?”xxvi 
 
The work of the philosopher of religion is to address these existential questions. Here we encoun-
ter the force of religion. Here is what gives energy and direction to the formal structures of religion. 
Tillich’s intervention challenges an academic philosophy which continues to bear the mark of 20th 
century logical positivism. The questions Tillich sees as vital for philosophers to engage with have 
largely been dumped as irrelevant. Reducing meaning to the analysis of language makes the in-
vestigation of religion colourless, precisely because to be engaged religiously is to be engaged 
with the great questions of existence: why am I here? what happens when we die? what gives 
meaning to life?  
 
John Cottingham argues for a return to these questions. We are vulnerable, mutable beings, and 
this reality is reflected in religion. This is “what is universal to the human condition - the lonely 
voice of the human soul, crying out in direst need, calling to God because there is nowhere else to 
go, because the voice can and must be heard.”xxvii
xxviii
 This is the experience that frames Augustine’s 
understanding of the restlessness of the heart that can only find peace when it finds its home in the 
divine. The religious is grounded in this passionate longing for something beyond the human. Be-
cause Cottingham frames the discussion in this way, he has critical words for analytic philosophers 
of religion: ‘Many analytic philosophers have signally failed to do justice to religion by treating it as 
an abstract set of intellectual doctrines to be dissected and evaluated in a detached and dispas-
sionate way.'  Instead, religion needs to be seen as involving 'modes of engagement with, or 
connection with, reality as a whole.'xxix   
 
Recognising the passionate longings at the heart of the religious impulse is not to ignore the some-
times problematic character of religious claims or actions. Indeed, it may be that if we acknowledge 
 9 
the role of emotion in shaping religiosity, we will be better placed to understand phenomena like 
religious terrorism. This cannot be explained rationally, but requires an understanding of the terrors 
and horrors of the human heart.xxx  Until we engage with the full range of experiences that make up 
the religious, our philosophical claims about it will lack legitimacy.   
 
There are other ways of practising philosophy. Nick Trakakis’ The End of Philosophy of Religion 
stands both as an indictment of the failings of analytic philosophy of religion, and as an appeal for 
philosophers to learn from the multiple methods of the Continental tradition. Indeed, the Western 
tradition on which analytic philosophy depends is not itself without compelling alternatives. Martha 
Nussbaum xxxiixxxi and Pierre Hadot  argue that the Ancient Hellenistic Schools shaped the pursuit of 
philosophy around the question of how to live well in the world. Philosophy through is thus a prac-
tice for living, rather than a set of philosophical methods disconnected from one's lived experience 
of the world. The existential questions highlighted by Tillich and Cottingham resonate with this ap-
proach, for it is not just religion that needs to be connected to life, but philosophy too.   
 
Remaking Human Nature: The Role of Philosophy and Homo Religiosus   
Re-orientating philosophy of religion toward the existential shifts the ground of our investigation. It 
is not just that we need to consider religious practice through this lens; it is that a renewed focus 
on the existential locates ‘the religious’ in the experience of being human. As Tillich and Cotting-
ham suggest, when the discussion of religion is connected to existential questions, the focus shifts 
to what is needed if we are to flourish as human beings. The question of religion is thus of im-
portance to all human beings, not just those who practice a specific faith.  
 
Here is the jewel that lies at the heart of the approach of the analytic philosopher of religion. For all 
the criticisms that can be made of the desire of philosophers to consider ‘religion’ apart from the 
practices of specific faiths, their methods open up the question of what it means to be human in a 
way that transcends the specificities of any faith tradition. By considering religion as something 
apart from the particularities of the world’s religions, there is an opportunity to consider what it 
means to be human, and, crucially, what is needed in order to flourish as a human being.xxxiii In the 
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remainder of this article, I suggest that this is vitally important for 21st century human beings. 
When secularism and materialism are being shaped by crudely economic accounts of what it is to 
be human, philosophers have an important role to play in offering models that resist reductionist 
accounts, and which open up, instead, the possibility of more fulfilling forms of life.  
  
For nearly forty years, Western politics has been dominated by what Michel Foucault called ‘homo 
economicus’, or ‘economic man’.xxxiv
xxxvi
 This vision of human being emanates from what commenta-
tors term ‘neoliberalism’.xxxv Philip Mirowski locates the origin of this way of conceiving politics and 
society in the ideas of the Mont Pelèrin Society that grouped around the economist Friedrich von 
Hayek in the late 1940s. Disturbed by the triumph of interventionist Keynesianism in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, the Society sought to promote the importance of individualism and free 
market capitalism. The ideas of the Society came into their own in the aftermath of the political cri-
ses of the 1970s when they ‘captured the ears and minds of politicians’.  In the 1980s, their 
ideas shaped the governments of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in 
the UK. These ideas have not disappeared in the years that followed, the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 doing little to dislodge this way of conceiving society. David Harvey’s description of neoliber-
alism shows something of its ideological range: 
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade.xxxvii 
 
Harvey highlights the way in which a set of economic policies - private property rights, free market, 
free trade - shape the very understanding of what it is to be human. Individuals are to be freed as 
'entrepreneurs of the self’, encouraged to shape their subjectivity as a kind of mini-business. A 
whole host of ‘virtues’ stem from this central idea: the individual is more important than the social; 
to be successful is to be materially wealthy; competition not cooperation is at the heart of human 
life.xxxviii  
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The critics of neoliberalism argue that we are so conditioned to think of the economic as the princi-
pal way for shaping our lives and our world that we have stopped recognising how strange this 
shift is. Areas of life previously valued apart from the economic - education, health, relationship - 
are now increasingly shaped by economic considerations. Consider the use of league tables to di-
rect resources; or the way in which economic questions - what will it cost? how much is it worth? - 
have become the bottom line for any discussion. We have been rendered incapable of seeing the 
strangeness of the values which shape our environment; they have become as natural to us as the 
air that we breathe.xxxix   
 
In a context where the preeminence of the economic is naturalised, we need something to shock 
us out of our complacency. Here, the religious gains traction. When religion is encountered in the 
21st century world, it is invariably identified with violence, fundamentalism, nostalgia, or conserva-
tism. And there is some truth in each of these negative categorisations. Yet because religious 
practice is something countercultural in Western society, the very shock of its application makes 
possible new ways of thinking. To talk of ‘the value of the religious’ acts as a provocation in a world 
where ‘value’ is always to be read through an economic lens, and helps us to think again about 
what it means to be human. Here, the investigation of ‘religion’ as something general rather than 
particular, opens up, rather than closes down, reflection.  
 
What does it mean to encounter the world religiously? There is a term that appears and reappears 
in the history and philosophy of religion that gets us closer to an answer. It also allows for a very 
different account of what it is to be human than that offered under neoliberalism. The term homo 
religiosus is used in a number of ways.
xliii
xl Sometimes it is used positively as denoting the human de-
sire for the sacred.xli We have seen one version of this rendition in Tillich’s claim that all human be-
ings need to align themselves with the deepest aspects of their being if they are to live well.xlii At 
other times it is used negatively as part of the challenge to false or superstitious ways of thinking. 
So Karl Barth in his argument with Emil Brünner claims that, in order for the revealed truth of the 
Christian God to be realised, beliefs that God can be found in nature must be resisted.  There is 
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nothing ‘natural’, for Barth, about the practice of ‘religion’. This criticism reflects his battle against 
forms of religion based in land and race advocated by the Nazis. In similar vein, his contemporary 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer argues against grounding Christian belief in religious attitudes, advocating, in-
stead, a ‘religionless’ form of Christianity which embraces human maturity and accepts the secular 
world.xliv    
 
So much for the history. An etymological analysis presents the potential of this image, for it allows 
a move away from habitual notions of what it is to be religious. To be religious need not mean that 
one has succumbed to unscientific accounts of the world or human beings; it need not mean that 
one is hiding behind a set of practices that allow hate and bigotry to be directed at those who are 
not like us, or who do not share our way of life. Far from seeing religion through such a narrow 
lens, an etymological reading opens up possibilities for our relationships to, and dependence upon, 
the world and others. It also makes possible a break with the claim that only in the economic is 
meaning to be found. 
 
The Latin ‘homo’ for ‘man’ is connected to the word ‘humus’, meaning earth. This suggests hu-
mans are earthly beings. Humans are, literally, ‘beings born from the earth’. It is not difficult to see 
the promise of this idea when it is considered against the increasingly atomised subject promoted 
by neoliberal market economics. Faced with the ecological catastrophe of climate charge, claiming 
that the individual is somehow separate from others and the world fails to take seriously the im-
portance of the world on which we depend for our existence.xlv ‘Homo religiosus’ suggests, by way 
of contrast, that we are, first and foremost, of this earth, that it is our home, and that it makes no 
sense to define ourselves as fundamentally separate from the physical processes that have 
brought us into being. Rather than strive to distinguish ourselves from the world, there is in the first 
part of this formulation an acknowledgement that we are fundamentally dependent on the earth. 
We are ‘earthly beings’. To live well, we must acknowledge our dependence on this fragile and vul-
nerable world. 
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In the formulation homo religiosus, these earthly beings are then described as ‘religious’. The at-
tempts of scholars to define what, precisely, religion means have been long and tortuous.
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi For E 
B Tylor’s substantive account, to be religious is to believe ‘in Spiritual Beings’.  For Emil Durk-
heim, religion is a function of human society.  While not denying the importance of either ap-
proach, I want to suggest an alternative way of thinking about religion that draws again upon its et-
ymology. There is a much-disputed, but highly evocative, definition that  identifies the word ‘reli-
gion’ with the Latin ‘religare’, meaning, literally, 'to bind’. What we have in religion is the attempt to 
bind oneself or to connect oneself - to bind oneself again - to the world and to others. Under this 
reading, when we think of religion - its rites and practices, its beliefs and ideas - we are emphasis-
ing the way such actions attempt to reconnect human beings with the world beyond themselves. If 
we consider the practices of the world’s faith traditions, we see this process at work. We must un-
bind ourselves from attitudes which deny a rich engagement with our world, in order to rebind our-
selves to others and the world in ways which enable us to flourish.  
 
This is about more than what it means to practice a religious faith. The desire for connection is the 
very thing that what makes us human. As hostile a figure to religion as Sigmund Freud is helpful 
for developing this idea. According to Freud, the human animal is not entirely at home in their 
world. We might be born of earthly processes, but the experience of consciousness - the ability to 
reflect on life in a mutable world - brings with it anxiety about our fragility in the face of natural 
forces that do not conform to our wishes. In order to overcome their feelings of vulnerability and 
alienation - in order to feel ‘at home’ in the worldxlix - humans develop ritualistic and repetitive be-
haviours. The desire to connect with others - to make relationship - is at the heart of the move to-
wards civilisation that protects us from having to face the terrors of nature alone. And yet these hu-
man connections are not in themselves enough for feeling grounded in this world. We desire to 
connect with something much more fundamental to our being: the world itself.    
 
Now, Freud is a master at revealing the problematic ways in which human beings attempt such 
connections. In his famous case study of the Rat Man, he describes a patient who has set in place 
a series of rituals which have to be performed in order to provide some kind of certainty about what 
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would happen during his day. His attempt to exert control over a frightening and unpredictable 
world may be doomed to failure, but his rituals by no means lack power. Indeed, they are so en-
trenched in his life that he is unable to function in the world: hence his presence on Freud’s thera-
peutic couch.l  
 
While we might dismiss such actions as relating only to the experience of ‘sick’ human beings in 
need of therapeutic cure, Freud suggests a connection between such behaviours and the way in 
which ‘healthy’ people live.li Think of the prevalence of superstitions. Even Freud, the arch advo-
cate of the methods of science, was not immune to the pull of such practices. In an addition to the 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life, he tells how he greeted the news that one of his daughters had 
recovered from a life-threatening illness. Walking through his study he ‘yielded to a sudden im-
pulse and hurled one of my slippers from my foot at the wall, causing a beautiful little marble Ve-
nus to fall down from its bracket’.lii Finding himself strangely unmoved, he sees his 'attack of de-
structive fury’ as serving ‘to express a feeling of gratitude to fate and allowed me to perform a ‘sac-
rificial act’ - rather as if I had made a vow to sacrifice something or other as a thank-offering if she 
recovered her health!’liii The presence of the exclamation mark suggests Freud is somewhat em-
barrassed by this action. Yet it bears witness to the understandable and very human desire to 
reach out to something other than the human in order to express his thanks for his daughter’s re-
covery. It is not difficult to think of superstitious practices as reflecting this attempt to connect with 
that which lies outside ourselves and our capacity. It is not such a great leap to see in superstitious 
actions of this kind a connection with the more formal practices of religious rituals.liv   
 
While Freud highlights the desire to control as the basic human motivation behind such actions, it 
is worth digging deeper in order to get at what lies behind such behaviours. There is something in 
these actions that suggests a (sometimes desperate) desire to reach out beyond the self and to 
connect with that which lies outside ourselves and our control. Freud’s sense of gratitude cannot 
be met simply by sending a card or a gift to the medical practitioners who enabled his daughter’s 
recovery. His feelings of relief and gratitude go beyond such obvious ways of giving thanks. His 
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desire reaches beyond himself to the very world itself, and it is notable that he writes in this pas-
sage of his desire to communicate with Fate. In such moments there is a reminder of the fragility of 
human life, dependent as it is on natural processes which shape and limit human power. 
 
The formal religious structuring of the desire for connection with such powers - felt in worship or 
prayer - is only one manifestation of the attempt to reach beyond oneself to world and others, as 
this example from Freud suggests. In returning to the idea of connection as a basic feature of hu-
manity, I am not suggesting that any particular religious tradition or any particular set of religious 
principles is the best or only way of expressing such desires. Nor do I claim that religious belief 
and practice is necessary in order to live well: which is not to say that I do not think such rituals 
and practices capable of enabling the space to reflect on how to live and what has intrinsic value.  
What I am advocating is something much more fundamental about the practices of the human ani-
mal. To be human is to be an animal whose subjectivity is defined through connection, and which 
is formed out of its attempts at relation with others and the world.   
 
If this fact is grasped, religion ceases to be something that can be hived off from the rest of life. In-
stead, it offers space for reflecting on the kinds of connection possible between self and others, 
self and the world. Here, the rituals of religion find their place. These are practice which enable us 
to reach outside ourselves in order to connect with that which lies at the heart of the universe and 
which flows through us in the processes that make us alive. 
 
If we are to live well, we need to cultivate ways of placing our lives in that broader universe which 
gives birth to us and to which we eventually return at death. The lived experience of religion 
acknowledges that good relationships need work. We need to work at binding ourselves ‘again’ to 
world and others. The questions Grace Jantzen raised in her Feminist Philosophy of Religion be-
come of crucial importance to the practice of philosophy of religion: what is needed in order to 
flourish? How do we develop trustworthy community?lv How do we live well in the world?lvi How do 
we live in such a way that we are able to embody ways of connecting that we see as so important 
that we call them divine? If as philosophers we focus our work on addressing these questions, the 
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study of religion starts to look very different. Addressing the lived experience of the religious life 
becomes the ground for exploring the qualities necessary for the truly flourishing human life.  
 
Advocating homo religiosus as the lens through which we might see each other goes some way to 
challenge the economic shaping of human nature. It allows for sustained criticism of accounts of 
the human which would make individuals and communities subservient to the movements of global 
capital. We are not competitors in the public space, but beings who need each other. In the shift to 
homo religiosus, there is the basis for a politics that addresses inequality, and that seeks to ground 
community in sustainable practices that help us live well with each other and with the world. 
 
Conclusion 
We have come a long way from the critique of analytic philosophy of religion. In the attempt to con-
sider religion as something more than the practices of a specific tradition, the analytic philosopher 
of religion makes possible the remaking of human nature. In religious practices, there is the possi-
bility for the kind of reflection that makes possible new ways of living. All human beings require 
connection with world and others. In this acknowledgment there is the possibility of challenging a 
world that would shape all value through the economic.  
 
Tillich suggests that ‘faith is a total and centred act of the personal self, the act of unconditional, 
infinite and ultimate concern’.
lviii
lvii For Tillich, faith is not simply to be found in specific religious prac-
tices. All individuals commit to something that they take for their ultimate concern. What matters is 
that whatever we commit to is worthy of our commitment. Here, the importance of depth comes to 
the fore, for it is through this process of reflective engagement that we get closer to that which 
grounds us in the world. Religion under this model ceases to be containable as a set of beliefs, 
and emerges, instead, as a way of engaging more deeply and fully with the world: ‘There can be 
no depth without the way to depth.’  It is in this process of striving for a deeper understanding that 
we participate in that which enables the flourishing life, and it is in providing resources for this work 
that philosophers of religion can be of much help. 
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